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• By comparing the yields on conventional and
Real Return Bonds, it is possible to calculate
the break-even inﬂation rate, or BEIR, which is
the average rate of inﬂation that equates the
expected returns on these two bonds. The
question then becomes, does the BEIR contain
useful information about long-run inﬂation
expectations?
• The BEIR has been higher, on average, and
more variable than survey measures of
expected inﬂation over the past 12 years. The
difference between survey measures and the
BEIRmeasure of inﬂation expectations may be
explained by a number of market-based
premiums and distortions that affect the BEIR.
• As a result of the potential distortions and the
difﬁculties in accounting for them, the BEIR
should not be given a large weight as a
measure of inﬂation expectations at this time.
• The continued development of the Real
Return Bond market should eventually result
in the BEIR becoming a more useful indicator.
• The BEIR demonstrates no clear advantage in
forecasting near-term inﬂation. Over all
horizonsexamined,surveymeasuresandeven
past inﬂation rates yield smaller forecasting
errors than the BEIR.
he difference between the yields on long-term
Government of Canada conventional bonds
and Real Return Bonds (RRBs), which is com-
monly referred to as the break-even inﬂation
rate(BEIR),haslongheldoutthepotentialofproviding a
unique, real-time, market-based measure of inﬂation
expectations. Since Canada issues RRBs with 30-year
maturities, the BEIR is constructed from yields on
long-term bonds and indicates the expected average
inﬂation over a 25- to 30-year horizon. In a study on
the BEIR, Côté et al. (1996) concluded that this meas-
ure needs to be interpreted with caution, owing to the
presence of a premium for inﬂation uncertainty and
other distortions resulting from the small size of the
RRB market. The authors maintained that “the differ-
ential over time may nonetheless be a good indicator
of movements in long-run inﬂation expectations.”
With the BEIR breaching three per cent in 2004, the top
of the inﬂation target band, there has been renewed
interest in the importance of such premiums and dis-
tortions. Furthermore, since RRBs were ﬁrst issued in
Canada in December 1991, almost 13 years of data are
now available to reassess the usefulness of this meas-
ure of inflation expectations.
The worth of the BEIR as a measure of
inﬂation expectations can be examined
from two perspectives: its usefulness as a
measure of monetary policy credibility
and as an aid to forecasting inﬂation.
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The worth of the BEIR as a measure of inﬂation expec-
tations can be examined from two perspectives: its
usefulness as a measure of monetary policy credibility
and as an aid to forecasting inﬂation. It follows that if
the BEIR captures inﬂation expectations accurately, its
position relative to the midpoint of the inﬂation target
band should be a good measure of credibility. To ascer-
tain the BEIR’s accuracy, the historical experience of
this measure was examined in relation to alternative
measures of the behaviour of long-run inﬂation expec-
tations.WhilethebroadtrendsintheBEIRconformwith
those of other measures of inﬂation expectations, the
BEIR is more volatile and at times deviates signiﬁ-
cantly from other measures. The purpose of this article
is to consider whether these movements can be attrib-
uted to changes in risk premiums and other distortions
affecting the BEIR rather than to changes in inﬂation
expectations. In addition, the BEIR’s forecasting per-
formance at short horizons is compared with that of
survey measures of expectations and other simple
models.
The Interest Rate Differential and
Inﬂation Expectations
For conventional bonds, the nominal value of the cash
flow is set in advance, while the real purchasing power
of these cash ﬂows deteriorates with inﬂation over the
term to maturity. Therefore, to preserve the real pur-
chasing power of these cash flows, the price of the
conventional bonds must reﬂect the required compen-
sation for expected inﬂation over the term of the bond
as well as a real rate of return. In contrast, as the name
implies, RRBs guarantee their holder a real return, pro-
tecting them from lower returns resulting from inﬂa-
tion. To do so, the coupon payment and the principal
repaid at maturity of RRBs are adjusted to include
compensation for inﬂation that has occurred since the
issuance of the bond.1 Assuming that the quoted real
yield on the RRBs is equivalent to the expected real
return on a conventional bond, and that both markets
are efﬁcient, the Fisher relationship2 says that, in the
absence of premiums and distortions, the difference
between nominal and real yields should be equivalent
to the average expected rate of inﬂation over the term
of the bonds.
1.  See “Canada—Real Return Bonds” on the Bank of Canada’s Web site
(http://www.bankofcanada.ca/en/notices_fmd/market_consult03.htm).
2.  Fisher relationship: 1 i + ()1 r + () 1 p
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The Historical Experience (1991 to
2003Q4)
The Government of Canada first issued RRBs in
December 1991. Chart 1 shows the RRB yield, the yield
from a 30-year nominal Government of Canada bond,
and the BEIR calculated from these two yields.
Table 1 shows the means and measures of the variabil-
ity of the nominal and real yields as well as the BEIR.3
The drop in the mean and variability of the BEIR in the
latter half of the sample coincides with a drop in the
mean and variability of the nominal yield. This is con-
sistent with inﬂation expectations and inﬂation uncer-
tainty falling over the sample. The real yield also dropped
3.  The sample includes quarterly data from 1991 to 2003Q4
Nominal 6.83 8.02 5.64 1.35 0.86 0.26
RRB 4.06 4.45 3.66 0.53 0.33 0.37
BEIR 2.74 3.52 1.96 0.95 0.66 0.36
Table 1
Full and Subsample Statistics
Mean Standard deviation
1992– 1992– 1998– 1992– 1992– 1998–
2003 1997 2003 2003 1997 2003
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on average in the latter half of the sample, but its vari-
ability was relatively unchanged. Formal inﬂation tar-
gets were adopted in Canada in February 1991, and
since December 1995 have been set to the current tar-
get of 2 per cent. Chart 2 shows that the BEIR was above
the inﬂation target in the early- to mid-1990s, tempo-
rarily below it from late 1997 to mid-1999, and very
close to target to the end of 2003. Longworth (2002)
and others cite the falling level of the BEIR between
1992 and 1997 as evidence of monetary policy becoming
more credible.
Also shown in Chart 2 are the three survey measures
of expected inflation: the median expected inflation
rate 4 to 14 years ahead from an annual survey of fore-
casters conducted by Watson Wyatt; the semi-annual
survey by Consensus Economics of forecasters’ inﬂa-
tion expectations 6 to 10 years ahead; and expectations
2 years ahead from the Conference Board of Canada’s
quarterlySurvey of Forecasters.4 The BEIRis higher than
the other measures of expectations for the ﬁrst half of
the sample—at times by more than 150 basis points.
It registers both the highest reading (4.9 per cent in
March 1992) and the lowest (about 1.0 per cent in late
1998). It also took longer to move to the target range
for inﬂation. However, over the past four years, until
the beginning of 2004, the BEIR was very close to 2 per
cent, the Bank of Canada’s target for inﬂation, along
4.  Inﬂation two years ahead is the expected inﬂation rate for the following
calendar year rather than over the next 12 months. The other survey measures
are similarly deﬁned.
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with the other measures of inflation expectations. From
2000 to 2003, taking surveys as the appropriate bench-
mark, any distortions in the level of the BEIR were, on
average, either small or offsetting.
Even if all of these series were perfect measures of
inﬂation expectations, their levels would be expected
to differ because they capture expectations over differ-
ent horizons. The measures of inﬂation expectations
are in fact quite different. The mean level of the BEIR
over the 1992 to 2002 sample is 2.8 per cent, above that
of the 4- to 14-year expectations (2.5 per cent), the 6- to
10-year (2.1 per cent), and the 2-year (2.0 per cent).
Thus, over this period, the longer the horizon over
which the expectation applies, the higher the average
expectation of inﬂation. This is consistent with a slow
increase in the long-term credibility of monetary pol-
icy, which led expectations over longer horizons to fall
gradually.
While it is too early to judge, the recent
movement of the BEIR in 2004 may
represent the beginning of a third
signiﬁcant deviation between this
measure and survey measures of
inﬂation expectations.
The BEIR is the most variable measure of longer-term
inflation expectations, showing an average annual
absolute change of 0.56 percentage points, at least
double that of the survey measures over any horizon.
The ﬁrst differences in the latter measures, taken at the
frequencies of the respective surveys, show little cor-
relation with changes in the BEIR, suggesting that
changes in one (or both) of these measures reflect
some phenomenon other than changes in inflation
expectations (Table 2). Historically, the higher peaks
and lower troughs of the BEIR are mainly linked to
two episodes: 1993–95, when the BEIR increased rap-
idly as other measures stabilized or fell; and 1997–99,
when the BEIR dropped sharply while other measures
fell only modestly or flattened. As of October 2004,
the BEIR was approximately 2.8 per cent, well above
its range over the preceding four years. While it is too
early to judge, the recent movement of the BEIR in 2004
may represent the beginning of a third signiﬁcant
deviation between this measure and survey measures
of inﬂation expectations.18 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • AUTUMN 2004
Differences between survey measures and the BEIR
may reﬂect ﬂaws in either measure. In this article, we
focus on the potential distortions affecting the BEIR,
including cash-ﬂow mismatches, term-varying inﬂa-
tion expectations, inﬂation- and liquidity-risk premi-
ums, and market segmentation.
Embedded Premiums and
Distortions: How Important Are
They?
The use of the BEIR to capture inﬂation expectations
depends on a number of fairly strong assumptions.
Investors are assumed to demand the same real return
from RRBs as from conventional Government of Canada
bonds. In addition, the BEIR calculation is premised on
well-functioning, efﬁcient markets with cross-market
arbitrage. Traditional bonds are also assumed to strictly
adhere to the Fisher relationship, which stipulates that
the only difference between a nominal interest rate
and the real interest rate is in fact expected inﬂation.
However, several factors may cause these assump-
tions to be violated and bias or distort the BEIR as a
measure of inﬂation expectations. Furthermore, the
calculation of the BEIR may introduce a bias, owing to
the different structures of the component bonds.
Cash-ﬂow mismatch
The RRB and the nominal bond that are used to con-
struct the BEIR have approximately the same maturity.
However, because the RRB’s coupon payments rise
with inflation while those of the nominal bond are
constant, an investor will receive different cash ﬂows
for the two products. A greater portion of the cash
ﬂow for RRBs will tend to occur later in the maturity
structure than for conventional bonds. Since the price
of a bond is simply the sum of discounted future cash
ﬂows, the two bonds will have different sensitivities
to the expected path of real interest rates and real
interest rate risk. These differences will inﬂuence the
2 years ahead (quarterly) 0.17 0.11 0.20
6-10 years ahead (semi-annual) 0.08 0.08 -0.36
4-14 years ahead (annual) 0.31 - -
Table 2
Correlations between Changes in the BEIR and
Other Measures of Inﬂation Expectations
Survey measures 1992–2003 1992–1997 1998–2003
yield spread between the securities for reasons unre-
lated to expected future inﬂation.
Therefore, to adjust for the differences in cash ﬂow in
calculating the BEIR, the yield to maturity of the RRB
should be compared not with that of a nominal
bond, but with that of a synthetic nominal bond
(created from a zero-coupon curve5) with exactly the
same stream of cash ﬂows as the RRB. Expressed dif-
ferently, by discounting the inflation-adjusted cash
flows with a zero-coupon curve, it is possible to solve
iteratively for the constant inﬂation expectations that
are consistent with the observed price (see Box).
Chart 3 illustrates both the BEIR and the cash-flow-
adjusted BEIR. The two measures are reasonably close,
but differ signiﬁcantly on occasion (Chart 4), with an
average bias of 20 basis points. The largest source of
week-to-week volatility in this bias calculation is the
issuance of a new benchmark bond, since the change
in length of maturity will alter the sensitivity to inter-
est rates of either component bond in the BEIR. There-
fore, thelevel and variations ofthe BEIR reflectnot only
inﬂation expectations, but also the discrepancy in the
interest exposure of each bond.
5. Results are based on the Merrill-Lynch-Spline exponential methodology to
extract the yield curve (Brenner et al. 2001) as calculated by Bolder, Johnson,
and Meltzer (forthcoming).
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Box
“Adjusting” for Cash-Flow Mismatches
Discounting Using a Zero-Coupon Curve
The price of a bond is the present value of its cash
ﬂows. The price (P) therefore reﬂects how much
money must be invested today, given a certain rate
of return (yield to maturity), for n periods, to pro-
duce a speciﬁc ﬂow of nominal payments. The spe-
ciﬁc future nominal cash ﬂows of a conventional
bond are known in advance. For example, a $100
par value semi-annual pay bond with a 5 per cent
coupon and a maturity of 30 years will make 60
payments of $2.50 and $100 at maturity. To deter-
mine the present value of this bond, the cash ﬂows
(CF) are discounted using this formula:
, (1)
where C= coupon and PL = principal. This formula
for calculating P assumes that the interest rate (i) or
yield to maturity used to discount each cash ﬂow is
constant. However, it is more appropriate to dis-
count each cash flow at the interest rate relevant to
when it is received. Therefore, each cash flow should
be considered separately; or, more technically, one
should value a bond as a package of zero-coupon
bonds, with each payment considered its own
bond. To determine the present value of each zero-
coupon bond, the future cash ﬂow is discounted
using the yield on a zero-coupon Government
bond with the same maturity .
. (2)
However, such bonds do not exist for every matu-
rity, and therefore theoretical foundations are used
to derive a zero-coupon curve. This article relies on
the Merrill-Lynch-Spline methodology to extract
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From equation (1) above, it follows that, for a given
interest rate, the further out the cash ﬂow, the lower
the present value. Since a greater portion of the
cash ﬂows of RRBs typically occurs later in the
maturity cycle than with conventional bonds, an
adjustment for this difference in structure should
be made.
There are several equivalent ways to approach the
cash-ﬂow adjustment. If expected future inﬂation is
known and constant over the term of the RRB, then
the stream of nominal payments from an RRB is
also known (the ﬁxed coupon and principal are
adjusted for inﬂation). The necessary portfolio of
zero-coupon bonds to replicate those cash ﬂows
exactly can then be constructed. The present value
of this portfolio is determined by summing each
cash flow that has been discounted using the zero-
coupon curve.
, (3)
where RCF = real cash ﬂow, RC = real coupon, and
RP = real principal. Of course, expected inﬂation is
not known, but since the current market price of
the RRB contains an implicit valuation of expected
inﬂation (the BEIR), this measure can now be calcu-
lated by solving iteratively for the constant infla-
tion rate that equates the market value of the RRB
with the calculated value of the synthetic portfolio
of zero-coupon bonds. By matching the cash flows
of the RRB with a portfolio of zero-coupon bonds,
the differences in the timing of the cash ﬂows are
accounted for. A slightly different but equivalent
approach consists of maintaining the constant inﬂa-
tion assumption but altering the level of inflation
until the resulting present value of the inﬂation-
adjusted cash ﬂows (discounted by the zero-cou-
pon curve) is equivalent to the observed market
price of the RRB.
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The bias will also be a function of the slope of the yield
curve, and accounting for it will further improve the
measure of inﬂation expectations from RRBs. In Octo-
ber 1996, for example, the yield curve was particularly
steep, which caused the BEIR to understate inflation
expectations by 31 basis points. Conversely, in March
2000, the yield curve was ﬂat to inverted,6 and inﬂa-
tion expectations would have been overstated by 10
basis points.
Term structure of inﬂation expectations
The BEIR is not a forward rate,7 in the sense that it
doesn’t refer to a future rate of inflation, but rather, is
more closely aligned with the average of inflation
over the maturity of the bonds. For example, if inﬂa-
tion is expected to be high for some period of time
and then to return to 2 per cent, the BEIR will be
above 2 per cent, even though it is a long-term meas-
ure. Thus, in order for the BEIR to be a good measure
of average inﬂation expectations, the term structure of
inﬂation expectations must be relatively constant.
When this assumption fails, a bias is introduced into
the BEIR measurement. As a result, term-varying inﬂa-
tion expectations will alter the level of the BEIR, add-
ing to its variability even when long-run expected
6.  The yield to maturity on a 30-year conventional Government of Canada
bond was signiﬁcantly lower than that of a similar bond with 20 years to
maturity.
7.  A forward rate is an interest rate that is set today but has future start and
stop dates.
Chart 4
Bias Resulting from Differences in Cash Flow
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inﬂation is unchanged. In this section, we explore the
extent to which the current reading of the consumer
price index (CPI) and short-term inﬂation expectations
can affect the BEIR.
In order for the BEIR to be a good
measure of average inﬂation
expectations, the term structure of
inﬂation expectations must be
relatively constant.
Table 3 shows the results of a sensitivity test of the BEIR
obtained under different levels of short-term inﬂation
expectations that last for varying lengths of time before
reverting to the inflation target of 2 per cent. For
example, if inﬂation is expected to be 3 per cent for the
next six months and 2 per cent for the remainder of
the 30 years to maturity, we should observe a BEIR of
2.03 per cent (while average inﬂation is 2.02 per cent).8
Clearly, a large and persistent deviation of inflation
expectations is required to create a significant bias.
The bias owing to the term structure of inflation
expectations is typically no larger than 3 to 4 basis
points (Christensen, Dion, and Reid 2004). However,
the bias will most likely be at its maximum (approxi-
mately 10 basis points, based on our sample) at criti-
8.  The difference between the BEIR and average inﬂation is driven by the
coupon structures of RRBs and nominal bonds.
6 months 2.03 2.02 2.05 2.03 - -
1 year 2.05 2.03 2.11 2.07 2.16 2.10
2 years 2.10 2.07 2.21 2.13 2.31 2.20
5 years 2.25 2.17 2.50 2.33 2.76 2.49
10 years 2.47 2.33 2.94 2.66 3.42 2.99
15 years 2.65 2.50 3.30 3.00 3.97 3.49
30 years 3.00 3.00 4.00 4.00 5.00 5.00
Table 3
BEIR under Different Structures for Inﬂation
Period of high 3% expected 4% expected 5% expected
expected inﬂation inﬂation inﬂation
inﬂation
before BEIR Average BEIR Average BEIR Average
returning to (%) inﬂation (%) inﬂation (%) inﬂation
the target (%) (%) (%)
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cal times, perhaps following a large relative price
shock when monetary authorities will be looking for
evidence that this shock is feeding into inﬂation
expectations.
Inﬂation-risk premium
Inflation risk reflects the probability that the actual
inﬂation rate will not match the expected rate. If inﬂa-
tion is signiﬁcantly higher over the term of a conven-
tional bond than was anticipated at the time of purchase,
the realized real rate of return will be lower than the
anticipated real rate of return. Investors in conven-
tional bonds require compensation for this risk, result-
ing, other things being equal, in higher nominal yields.
In contrast, RRB investors do not face inflation risk
because RRBs compensate for realized inﬂation.9 For
this reason, the BEIR contains a positive inflation-risk
premium, the magnitude of which is in turn depend-
ent on the degree of uncertainty about future inﬂation
and the degree of risk aversion.
Chart 5 shows two proxies of long-run inflation
uncertainty. The ﬁrst is a measure of the disagreement
among forecasters who responded to the Watson Wyatt
survey, calculated as the difference between the upper
and lower quartiles of reported inﬂation expectations
at the 4- to 14-year horizon. The second measure is
inflation uncertainty over a 5-year forecast horizon
9.  In practice, there is some inﬂation risk, owing to the indexation lag and
taxation.
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derived from a GARCH model developed by Craw-
ford and Kasumovich (1996).10
Côté et al. (1996) suggest that the increase in the BEIR
in 1994, which was not accompanied by a similar
move in survey measures, may reﬂect an increase in
the inﬂation-risk premium. If changes in the premium
for inﬂation uncertainty are an important factor in
explaining movements in the BEIR, then sharp
movements in these proxies should be associated
with similar movements in the BEIR. Yet both meas-
ures fail to indicate a rise in inflation uncertainty in
1994 or a significant decline in 1997. Crawford and
Kasumovich’s measure of inﬂation uncertainty fell
dramatically during the 1980s but has been relatively
stable since 1992. Similarly, survey disagreement fell
between 1991 and 1994 but was relatively stable
afterwards. The simplest explanation is that devia-
tions of the BEIR from survey measures of inflation
expectations are the result of some phenomenon
other than changes in uncertainty regarding inﬂation.
Liquidity-risk premium
Owing to the relatively small number of RRBs out-
standing, investors may demand a higher yield on
RRBs to compensate them for the risk that they will
not be able to sell RRBs quickly or will have to sell at
unfavourable prices. Other things being equal, this
will result in a higher real yield and a lower BEIR. If
this liquidity-risk premium is present, it should fall
over time as more RRBs are issued and traded. In fact,
there has been an improvement in liquidity since the
beginning of the RRB program. The stock of RRBs out-
standing increased from $4.1 billion at the end of 1994
to $17.3 billion at the end of 2003, rising from 9 per
cent to 26 per cent of federal government marketable
debt with a maturity of 10 years or greater.
However, even with a much greater stock outstanding,
the liquidity premium may rise during periods when
investors demonstrate a heightened preference for
highly liquid assets. A dramatic deterioration in liquid-
ity, if there were one, could explain the declining dif-
ferential between the BEIR and survey measures of
expected inﬂation between 1997 and 1999. During that
period, global financial markets were heavily influenced
by a series of shocks, chiefly the Asian crisis and the
10. Similar analyses were undertaken using implied volatility from long-term
swaptions as a proxy for long-term inﬂation uncertainties in the sample 1997
to 2003. No positive relationship was identiﬁed. A swaption gives the holder
the right (but not the obligation) to enter into an interest rate swap having a
predetermined ﬁxed rate at some later date.22 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • AUTUMN 2004
Russianbonddefault.Itisconceivablethat,underthese
conditions of ﬁnancial instability, the value investors
placed on liquidity increased substantially. Shen and
Corning (2001) find evidence of an increase in the
liquidity-risk premium in the U.S. bond market from
1997 to 1999, using the yield spread between on-the-
run and off-the-run conventional 10-year Treasury
bonds as a proxy for the lower bound of the liquidity-
risk premium in Treasury Inﬂation Protected Securi-
ties (TIPS), which are U.S. inﬂation-linked bonds. On-
the-run bonds are the most recently issued bonds and
are considered to be highly liquid. Conversely, off-the-
run bonds are older securities that trade less often and
are relatively less liquid. Therefore, by comparing the
yield spread between the liquid on-the-run and the less
liquid off-the-run bonds with similar maturities, the
value of liquidity can be approximated.11
The relative lack of liquidity of RRBs compared with
conventional bonds also discourages arbitrage, con-
tributing to a less-efficient market. The resulting
lack of efﬁciency in the RRB market could in turn lead
to persistent mispricing. Lack of liquidity in the
secondary market, for example, may make it difﬁcult
for market participants to complete a short RRB trans-
action (borrow and sell now, with the hope of
purchasing the bonds more cheaply in the future).
Participants’ difﬁculty in borrowing RRBs to execute a
short sale has been greatly alleviated by the evolution
of security lending, as pension funds and other large
accounts now regularly lend securities from their
portfolios in return for a fee. However, the current
strong demand for RRBs and the lack of depth in the
secondary market could make it more difﬁcult to pur-
chase RRBs in order to return the borrowed securities
(i.e., unwinding the short sale). A difficulty in covering
a short RRB position limits participants’ ability to take
advantage of possible market mispricing. Speciﬁcally,
if the BEIR were significantly higher than expected
inﬂation, participants would normally buy conven-
tional bonds and sell RRBs until this mispricing was
eliminated. However, a difficulty with purchasing
RRBs (once the price has fallen closer to fundamentals)
in order to exit from a short RRB position would imply
11.   The high value of on-the-run U.S. Treasury bonds in the repurchase mar-
ket may result in an upward bias in this measure of liquidity in the United
States. Christensen, Dion, and Reid (2004) ﬁnd little evidence of a liquidity-
risk premium in Canada using a similar methodology. However, it is possible
that this method of measuring liquidity is not particularly suited to the Cana-
dian experience, since there is little difference in on-the-run and off-the-run
securities.
that RRBs can remain mispriced12 over the short term.
An increase in supply or the anticipation of greater
supply should act to moderate this effect over time.
Market segmentation and supply
constraints
Côté et al. (1996) and Mayer (1998) argue that the BEIR
may reflect not the overall market view of inflation
expectations, but the view of a non-representative
subset of investors. The argument that the RRB market
is segmented among investors with different degrees
of risk aversion in regards to inflation requires the sup-
ply of RRBs to be relatively inelastic. In other words, if
only a small amount of inﬂation-linked debt exists, it
is likely to be owned by those with the highest inﬂa-
tion expectations or the biggest need for inﬂation pro-
tection, or by investors who have some tax advantage
that allows them to accept a lower yield. As the amount
of debt grows, however, inﬂation-linked debt should
increasingly be held by investors who more accurately
reﬂect the average expectation of, and sensitivity to,
inﬂation. In the short run, it is reasonable to consider
supply as being constrained (e.g., by rigid govern-
ment funding policies or the high ﬁxed costs faced by
corporations implementing an inflation-linked borrow-
ing program). To date, the supply of these types of
securities has been relatively unresponsive to changes
in price. In the long run, however, supply should also
adjust eventually to take advantage of lower funding
costs.
Using expectations survey data from Watson Wyatt,
the maximum and upper quartile cutoff of responses,
along with the BEIR, are plotted in Chart 6. Until 1996,
the BEIR is usually inside the upper quartile of infla-
tion expectations, consistent with RRB investors not
representing the average investor.13 Subsequently, the
BEIR falls below this range. The break in this relation-
ship in 1996 coincides with the announcement of the
launch of the TIPS program. Not only did this mean
more global supply and expected future supply
through government issuance, it may have raised
expectations regarding the development of the corpo-
rate inﬂation-linked securities market and led to more
interest in, or acceptance of, Canadian RRBs. As a
12.  The price distortion is in theory symmetrical and is dependent on
demand conditions.
13. Note that the survey used for comparison may be subject to the same crit-
icism, since respondents are drawn only from ﬁnancial institutions and not
from the whole population.23 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • AUTUMN 2004




The correct interpretation of the high level of the BEIR
in October 2004 and in particular of its movement
towards the upper band of the inﬂation target remains
an open question. A rise in long-term inﬂation expec-
tations reﬂected in the BEIR would suggest that mar-
ket participants do not expect the Bank of Canada to
conduct monetary policy so as to contain inﬂation (an
erosion of credibility). The most recent survey data
(as of October 2004), however, do not show a similar
increase in expectations, suggesting that perhaps the
recent value of the BEIR reﬂects temporary market dis-
tortions rather than increasing inﬂation expectations
or heightened inﬂation uncertainty. Supporting this
argument, some market participants argue that a re-
evaluation of equity risk by investors after the sharp
declines in equity markets between 2000 and 2002 is
driving strong demand for alternative means to hedge
inﬂation and increase portfolio diversiﬁcation (Can-
ada 2003). This strong demand and the relatively ﬁxed
short-run supply of index-linked debt may have
driven the real yields on RRBs temporarily below the
long-run expected real interest rate, resulting in a
higher measure of the BEIR even if expected inﬂation
were unchanged. Consistent with this argument, the
Chart 6





































real yield declined from approximately 3 per cent in
November 2003 to about 2.3 per cent in October 2004
(Chart 1). The elevated level of the BEIR might there-
fore be the result of a portfolio shift and could indicate
that the RRB market is still highly segmented.
The correct interpretation of the high
level of the BEIR in October 2004 and
inparticularofitsmovementtowards
the upper band of the inﬂation target
remains an open question.
The high level of the BEIR is the result not only of an
earlier decline in the real rate, but also of an increase
in the yields of conventional Government of Canada
bonds. In addition, the relatively stimulative stance of
monetary policy, a strengthening in the global economy,
and rising oil prices could all be contributing to higher
inﬂation expectations or inﬂation uncertainty. How-
ever, while an increase in expectations or uncertainty
cannot be dismissed, it is highly probable that the recent
increase in the BEIR significantly exaggerates any
change in expectations and/or  uncertainty.14 It
remains to be seen whether alternative measures of
inflation expectations (such as surveys) will fail to
conﬁrm an increase in inﬂation expectations or height-
ened uncertainty, as has occurred in the past.
The BEIR as a Measure of Credibility
If the BEIR’s movements reﬂect inﬂation expectations
or an inflation-risk premium, they should be a good
indicator of monetary policy credibility. When the
BEIR is evaluated as a measure of the credibility of
monetary policy, the existence of an inflation-risk
premium is not a drawback, since uncertainty about
future inflation must reflect investors’ views about
the central bank’s willingness and ability to take action
to control future inﬂation. Since inﬂation uncertainty
is positively correlated with the level of inflation or
inflation expectations, the BEIR will tend to move
14. For example, to get a BEIR near 2.7 per cent, according to Table 3, inﬂation
expectations would have to be 3 per cent for the next 15 years before return-
ing to 2 per cent.24 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • AUTUMN 2004
more than one for one with an increase in expected
inﬂation. Either a lower, or a less variable, inﬂation-
risk premium would be a sign of increased credibility.
If the premiums and distortions discussed in this article
are unable to account for the movements in the BEIR
over history, there is a higher probability that the BEIR
was reﬂecting long-term expected inﬂation. However,
over the 1990s, it is likely that most of these premiums
and distortions were present in some form. Given these
findings, there is reason to doubt that the BEIR was a
good measure of credibility over this time period.
However, over the period 2000Q1 to 2003Q4, both
the BEIR and survey measures of inflation expectations
were relatively stable, near 2 per cent. More precisely,
the mean of the BEIR was 2.2 per cent, and it was
between 1.8 and 2.6 per cent 95 per cent of the time
(although week to week it is not uncommon to see
changes of up to 17 basis points in either direction). If
surveys are an appropriate benchmark, this suggests
that the premiums over this period were small relative
to the past, and that the BEIR has improved as a meas-
ure of the expected average rate of inﬂation. However,
more recent signs of distortion make it more difﬁcult
to draw inferences about credibility. The continued
development of the RRB market should eventually
result in the BEIR becoming a more reliable indicator
of the credibility of monetary policy.
The continued development of the
RRB market should eventually result
in the BEIR becoming a more reliable
indicator of the credibility of
monetary policy.
Forecasting Power
A good gauge of credibility is not necessarily a good
forecast of inﬂation outcomes, especially if monetary
policy reacts to measures of inﬂation expectations.
However, there is some evidence from the United King-
dom in favour of using interest rate measures for fore-
casting inﬂation. Scholtes (2002) ﬁnds that the forecast
accuracy of the BEIR, constructed using index-linked
gilts (U.K. inﬂation-linked bonds) with a 2-year matu-
rity, outperforms survey measures of expected inﬂa-
tion at a 2-year horizon. Other measures of inﬂation
expectations derived using index-linked gilts in the
United Kingdom have also been shown to possess
predictive power for inﬂation at the 1- to 4-year hori-
zon (Breedon 1995; Barr and Campbell 1997).
In Canada, RRBs are issued only with long maturities,
and thus, the relatively short span of RRB history does
not permit a comparison of the BEIR with the realized
average rate of inﬂation over a 30-year horizon. Yet
the BEIR should be influenced by expected inflation over
many different horizons and, as a result, may contain
useful information about inflation (CPI excluding taxes
and core inflation) over a short to medium horizon.
The results of the BEIR’s forecasting performance over
a policy-relevant horizon are shown in Table 4 . Over
the entire sample, the BEIR has the worst forecast per-
formance for CPI excluding taxes in terms of root
mean-squared errors (RMSEs). Survey measures and
even past average inﬂation rates yield lower RMSEs
than the BEIR at all horizons examined. The volatility
in the BEIR caused by premiums and distortions in the
ﬁrst part of the sample is one potential explanation for
BEIR 1.67 1.82 1.80 1.02 1.15 0.97
Naïve measures
Inﬂation over the
past 12 months 1.16 1.07 1.06 1.46 1.40 1.27
Inﬂation over the
past 24 months 1.01 1.00 1.02 1.24 1.23 1.23
Inﬂation over the
past 36 months 0.97 0.98 1.08 1.12 1.17 1.28
Inﬂation target 0.89 0.85 0.81 0.89 0.94 1.00
Survey measures
6 months aheada 0.85 0.84 0.79 1.02 1.10 0.94
2 years aheadb 0.86 0.92 0.90 0.93 1.10 0.94
6-10 years aheadc 0.85 0.86 0.95 0.79 0.79 0.89d
Table 4
Root Mean-Squared Forecast Errors of the BEIR
and Other Measures of Inﬂation Expectations
for Total CPI Inﬂation, Excluding Taxes
Forecast Horizon
Sample starting 1992 Sample starting 1998
1 year 2 years 3 years 1 year 2 years 3 years
a. Quarterly Business Conﬁdence Survey: Conference Board
b. Quarterly Survey of Forecasters: Conference Board
c. Semi-annual: Consensus Economics
d. Limited number of observations (10 or less)25 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • AUTUMN 2004
its poor near-term forecast performance. The 6- to 10-
year survey expectations have RMSEs that are roughly
half as large as the BEIR and were much closer to the
inflation target for the whole sample. The best forecast
performance is dependent on the horizon, but comes
from either surveys of expectations or simply using
the inﬂation target as a forecast for future inﬂation.
These results are actually reassuring, in the sense that
the BEIR does not simply reﬂect changes in short-term
expected inﬂation.
Conclusions
The merit of the BEIR as a measure of long-term inﬂa-
tion expectations is dependent on the importance of
risk premiums and distortions and our ability to account
for these factors. Having set out to consider whether
the differences between survey measures and the BEIR
can be explained by these various premiums and dis-
tortions, we argue that neither cash-ﬂow mismatches
nor term-varying inﬂation expectations can account
for the difference. In addition, proxies of inflation
uncertaintysuggestthat,whilethispremiumdidchange
over the sample, the timing did not coincide with
movementsintheBEIR.Futhermore,theliquidity-risk
premium may explain part of the decline in the BEIR
over the 1997 to 1999 period. Finally, supply constraints
in the RRB market appear to be a signiﬁcant part of
the explanation of why the BEIR tends to deviate from
survey measures on occasion. Evidence suggests that
these premiums and distortions were less prevalent in
the period 2000 to the end of 2003, but may again be
present so far in 2004. The variability of the BEIR also
declined during this period, but week-to-week move-
ments can still be substantial, making the BEIR difficult
to interpret on a high-frequency basis.
Because of the potential distortions and the difﬁculty
accounting for them, it is premature to consider the
BEIR a reliable measure of long-run inﬂation expecta-
tions. Despite these ﬁndings, the BEIR should not be
completely dismissed. If distortions and premiums
can be ruled out, or better accounted for, the BEIR
would be a useful measure of monetary policy credi-
bility. It represents a more timely and market-based
alternative to survey measures and should, along with
the continued development of the RRB market, even-
tually become a more reliable indicator of long-term
inflation expectations.
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